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1 HORIZONTALITY, RADIATION AND PRIVATE LAW IN 
GENERAL 
It now seems clear. when interpreting the wording of the relevant sections 
of the 1996 Constitution,l and particularly section 8,2 in the light of the 
main tenets of interpretation advanced by the Constitutional Court in Du 
Plessis v De Klerk.' that direct horizontal application of the basic rights 
protected in Chapter 2 of the Constitution to private relations regulated by 
"private law", is possible: Private law is, of course, not so "private", and 
that goes equally for the law of contract - certainly contract is and must 
be largely a private matter, but we should remind ourselves. even leaving 
the Bill of Rights aside for the moment, that objective values, norms and 
public policy playa decisive role in the creation and validity of contracts -
reasonable reliance on consensus can create contractual liability and 
legality is a reqUirement for validity. Also, these limitations on private 
autonomy are becoming increasingly important in respect of the 
enforcement of validly created contractual rights5 and the remedies for 
breach of contract. 
Whether a right is directly enforceable in terms of the Constitution and 
whether a new remedy may be created in the process will of course 
depend on the nature of the right and of the duty imposed by the right. In 
this regard I suppose the preponderant weight oj the social interests 
involved over the private interests at stake, will playa role, Social interests 
relate to rights of general application and enforceability subject to other 
such rights which are regarded as weightier in the circumstances, while 
private interests (recognised and protected by society. of course) are 
I Act 108 of 1996. 
2 Also ss 36 and 39, 
3 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) 876-903, 
4 Cf in general Woolman and Davis 1996: 361: Cockrell 1996: 1, 
5 Cf some recent articles on the topic Van der Merwe and Van Huyssteen 1995: 549; 
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always relative and subject to a process of balancing the interests of the 
individuals concerned. 6 Thus, and in the first place, if the case is a matter 
within the "public domain" (where social interests are dominant), direct 
enforceability is indicated. This approach would satisfactorily and properly 
provide space for the application of the limitations clause (section 36) in 
terms of which only social interests are considered - this test would 
obviously be too unsophisticated if private interests had to be balanced, 
considering also social interests. 
Where direct enforceability is not possible because private interests are 
paramount or at least indicative oj the relative weight to be attached to 
competing social interests, the interpretation section of the Bill of Rights 
(section 39) comes into play. which mandates a court. when developing 
the common law. to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights. Section 8, by making the Bill applicable to all law and binding also 
the judiciary. Jays the foundation. in the context of indirect horizontality. 
for a mandatory and overt "constitutional audit" by the court in every 
relevant case.1 
There is some support for the view that this may be so even jf a litigant 
does not bring a protected right in issue or even if the case does not 
strictly concern "development". that is. the extension of open-ended 
principles to a particular case. On the other hand, practicality and the 
general approach by the courts thus far that the Bill of Rights was not 
intended to "meddle" in every aspect of private relations. would require a 
party to allege and prove the relevance and applicability of a particular 
right. s However, it appears that the Constitutional Court would then be 
able to reassess a decision on the basis that it does not properly give effect 
to section 39. and refer the case back for that to be done.9 
The main difference in substance between direct and indirect horizon-
tality is that in the latter type of case the court must also take the private 
interests of the parties in the particular circumstances of the case into 
account and balance them. whereas in a case of direct horizontal application 
a rule of general applicability is formulated. subject only to Iimitation. 1o 
2 FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 
Freedom of contract as such is not expressly listed in the Bill of Rights. 
which may support the hierarchical argument that it is necessarily sub-
6 See the examples given below. For a discussion of the concepts of social and private 
interests and their relationship to each other see Van der Merwe and Van Huyssteen 
1995: 560-561 and the sources cited there. Cf also Reeves &. Another v Mar/ield 
171Surance Brokers CC &. Another 1996 3 SA 766 (A) 775 where the Court seems to 
accept the interests approach as valid in the context of illegal agreements. 
7 Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) 876-903; Rivett-Camac v Wiggens 1997 3 SA 
80 (C) 87. 
8 Knox D'An:y Ltd v Shaw 1996 2 SA 651 (\N). 
9 Cf the position in German law - Strydom 1995: 696. 
10 Knox D'Arcy Ltd v Shaw 1996 2 SA 651 0N}. Cf Fidelity Guards Holdings (Pty) (Ltd) v 
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ordinate to any listed right with which it may conflict, such as the rights to 
freedom of trade, occupation or profession, equality, freedom of asso-
ciation, and access to housing. On the other hand, of course, freedom of 
contract is not only an expression of the basic values of autonomy. self-
expression and individual growth and development (which certainly 
underlie, in general terms, the whole Bill of Rights"). but also forms the 
direct basis of listed rights such as some of those mentioned above. As 
such, freedom of contract may form the basis of private interests or social 
interests, depending on the circumstances. 
It will thus clearly not do to take an oversimplified view of the position 
of freedom of contract in the context of the Bill of Rights. It would also be 
generally accepted that much weight still has to be attached to the many 
judicial pronouncements (pre- and post Bill of Rights) that freedom of 
contract and the concomitant principle of pacta servanda sunt are 
generally favoured by public policy.'2 Depending on the circumstances, 
freedom of contract remains a weighty factor in the balancing process - in 
a case of direct application of a protected right it could feature as a 
limiting factor,13 and in a case of indirect application it would obviously 
have to be shown why the agreement should not have full force and effect. 
However, as I will attempt to show in more detail below, it appears that 
the Bill of Rights will provide the impetus for a second or third new age for 
the law of contract in which freedom of contract and pacta servanda sunt 
will reappear in their proper perspective as part of one of the three great 
principles of the law of obligations -
• no one shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of another; 
• damage wrongfully caused shall be compensated; and 
• contractual relations shall comply with the requirements of good faith 
between the parties. 
3 DIRECT APPLICATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
The inclusion of. for example, a racially discriminating clause against sub-
letting in a contract of lease of a theatre for the operation of which a licence 
from a public authority is necessary. would to my mind clearly be directly 
impugnable as being against the equality clause, section 9. This would be 
so even though the lessee had already agreed to the term, since the public 
and social interest in eradicating discrimination clearly outweighs the sole 
legitimate private interest of the lessor that his or her contract must be 
enforced, and moreover. the case probably falls within a broad concept of 
the public domain. 
11 Cf Ryland v Edros 1997 2 SA 690 (Cl 707·709; Knox D'Arcy Ltd v Shaw 1996 2 SA 65 J 
(W). 
J 2 See e g Sasfin v Beukes 1989 1 SA I (Al 9; Knox D'Arcy Ltd v Shaw 1996 2 SA 651 (W). 
Cf also Fidelity Guards Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Pearmain 1997 10 BCLR 1443 (SE) 1450G 
where the Court regards the remarks made in this connection in the Knox D'Arcy case 
as "still apposite". that is. in terms of the 1996 Constitution. 










































I ....... LAW,DEMOCf\ACY&DE\lElOPMENT····· 
Similarly, a term in a property development contract which purports to 
bind the developer not to sell stands to (for example) Seventh Day Ad-
ventists, could be directly attacked with reference to the equality c1ause,14 
the right to freedom of movement and residence, and the right to access 
to housing - there are no discernable legitimate private interests to be 
weighed against the overwhelming social interest in the application of the 
rights mentioned. 
So also would a constitution of an association, for example a chess club, 
which is affiliated to the national body which issues national colours and 
which contains a sexually discriminatory clause, be directly under con-
stitutional scrutiny - the social interest as expressed in the equality and 
freedom of association clauses prima facie override the freedom to regu-
late one's own affairs without interference. IS 
3.1 The application of the freedom of trade clause in the Bill of 
Rights 
A matter which has often come before the courts. in terms of both the 
interim Constitution and the 1996 Constitution. is that of the application 
of the freedom of trade clause in the Bill of Rights. 16 The crucial question 
now is whether section 22 which provides that every citizen has the right 
to choose their trade, occupation or profession freely. has the effect that a 
contractual restraint of trade is unconstitutional, unless it can be proved to 
be acceptable in terms of the limitation clause, section 36. 
Under the interim Constitution the courts have consistently, and for 
various reasons, decided that the current common law position should be 
maintained - that is, that a restraint which has properly been agreed to is 
prima faCie valid, unless it is against the public policy (and thus illegal), that 
is, unreasonable inter partes or infringing the public or social interests in 
another way. 
This approach also seems to be endorsed by the Court under the 1996 
Constitution in the Fidelity Guards-case. at least in the earlier part of its 
judgement. 17 On the other hand, some commentators apparently insist 
that section 22 is without more applicable, either directly,lS or indirectly,I9 
subject of course to potential limitation. In the final analYSiS, the Court in 
the Fidelity Guards-case appears to favour direct application of the right to 
free trade, but argues that a reasonable restraint (that is inter partes and 
probably also from the point of view of the public interest) is 
(automatically?) an acceptable limitation of general application in terms of 
section 36.20 Despite this, the Court shrinks from finding that a restraint is 
prima faCie unconstitutional and invalid, and that the onus to prove 
14 CfCockrell1997: 48-49. 
15 Cf Woolman and Davis 1996: 361. 
16 S 26. now 5 22. 
17 Fidelity Guards Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Pearmain 1997 10 BCLR 1443 (SE) 1450G-1. 
18 E g Davis 1996: 29-1 Off. 
19 Van Aswegen 1995: 66. 
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reasonableness is consequently on the party claiming enforcement of the 
restraint. The approach of the Court in this case seems too robust, and not 
in accordance with the primary purpose of the limitations clause - private 
interests, which are primarily in issue in restraint cases, should not be 
summarily elevated to matters of public interest and general application. 21 
The answer seems to lie in the analysis put forward above, which in this 
context is supported by the distinction relating to the kinds of interests 
involved made in the leading case on contractual restrictions on freedom 
to trade in Magna Alloys and Research (SA) Pty Ltd v Ellis22 and in the 
constitutional analysis conducted by van SchalkwykJ in Knox D'Arcy Ltd v 
Shaw:3 Where the social interest in maintaining freedom of trade, 
occupation or profession is paramount and overrides the principle that 
agreements must be fulfilled, (which has at least an important private 
dimenSion) then the restraint will be unconstitutional unless it can pass 
the test of the limitations clause. An example of such a case could be 
where a partnership agreement between medical general practitioners 
places an area restriction on the partner leaving the partnership which 
would result in a serious lack of medical care in the community. In this 
regard the right to access to health care services (section 27) is also relevant. 
Where, however, no such social interests appear to be paramount, the 
matter is one of balancing the private interests of the contractants, that is, 
whether the restraint is reasonable inter partes considering the legitimate 
protectable interests of the one party, against the restrictions placed on 
the other. Since such a process certainly accords with the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Constitution, the status quo in the common Jaw as set 
out above is maintained.24 
4 INDIRECT APPLICATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
It is probably in this field that we will see the most far-reaching and 
ultimately radical influence, resulting in a new perspective on the role of 
contractual freedom and its most relevant consequence, namely that 
agreements must be kept and should be enforced. 
4.1 Validity of an agreement and public policy 
The most obvious areas where the Constitution may indirectly impact on 
freedom of contract is where open-ended policy norms already exist and 
are already in terms of the common law decisive regarding the validity or 
enforceability of an agreement. Here the rule that an agreement which 
offends against public policy is illegal and therefore void or unenforceable 
is of the greatest relevance, and the influence of the Constitution has 
21 Cf in general terms the analysis in Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natai 
1998 1 SA 765 (Ce). 
22 19844 SA 874 (A). 
23 19962 SA 651 (W) 6600. 6610, 
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already been felt regarding the content and interpretation of public policy. 
In the case of Ryland v Edros25 Farlam J decided that an agreement (a 
marriage by Muslim rites) in the context of a potentially polygamous 
marriage was not against the public policy. as is now reflected in the 
Constitution - in the process not applying a previous appellate decision to 
the contrary. In casu the constitutional principles of equality. tolerance and 
accommodation as inferred from and stated in the preamble, various 
sections of the Bill of Rights and postamble were cited as validating such 
an agreement. 26 Interestingly, in this case the Constitution did not limit but 
extended freedom of contract. It may of course well be that in a case like 
this direct application of the Bill of Rights is appOSite. 
4.2 Enforceability of a contract - a wider context 
4.2.1 The development of goodfaith 
Another. and wider. area of constitutional influence in the context of 
public policy and the validity or enforceability of an agreement is the 
possible recognition and development of a general nonn regulating the 
enforceability of a concluded contract and applying to all its phases: the 
process of conclUSion. its validity (legality) and its enforcement.27 Very 
recently in a forceful separate Judgement in Eerste Nasionale Bank van 
Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman' Olivier JA placed the principle of good 
faith squarely within the realm of public policy in this context. as actually 
being part of public policy.29 In this connection he found authority in. 
among others. SasJin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes30 where the Court applied the norm 
of "simple justice between man and man" when refusing to enforce a very 
onerous cession and suretyShip which had the result of reducing Beukes to 
a "slave" of Sasfin. 
In so far as good faith in our law of contract is understood to require, in 
general terms. that a contracting party. while advancing his or her own 
interests should also show some (reasonable?) respect for the interests of 
the other party. it certainly accords with the spirit. purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights. As such. courts would be mandated by section 39 to 
develop and apply the norm. in spite of the oft-expressed judicial re-
luctance based on the perception that the notion of sanctity of contract is 
practically inviolable. Courts will always have to be mindful of the possi-
bility of reassessment by the Constitutional Court. 
Various concepts of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights might playa 
role in concretising the norm in the particular circumstances of the case. 
The right to equality comes to mind. the right to dignity. to freedom of 
25 1997 2 SA 690 (C). 
26 707·709. 
27 See Cockrell 1997: 44·49 for a discussion of this issue in relation to the exercise of 
contractual powers and discretions. 
28 19974 SA 302 (SCA). 
29 408D·E. 
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trade, but also the more general values underlying the Bill of Rights -
those of mutual respect, communality, abhorrence of subjugation in any 
form and the right of each individual to freedom to prosper and thrive. 
4.2.2 "Unfair" contract terms 
In cases of alleged unfair terms which, it is argued. should not be en-
forced. good faith would require that the one party should not be allowed 
to unreasonably overprotect his own interests to the unreasonable pre-
judice of the other. considering. for example. the commercial nature and 
setting of the contract, its purpose. the relationship between the parties 
and the circumstances surrounding its conclusion. Thus good faith could 
supply gUidelines and give content to the norm of "simple justice between 
man and man" which is presently generally accepted to be a requirement 
of public policy when considering the legality and enforceability of an 
"unfair" contract - at the same time it would widen the scope of appli-
cation of public policy. 
Consequently. it would appear that more accommodation in respect of 
the enforcement of contracts is at hand. One can foresee that. in parti-
cular. the enforcement of suretyship contracts will be affected, since often 
(clearly not always) the circumstances surrounding their conclusion as well 
as their contents are inimical to good faith and the Constitution. and that 
duties of disclosure. explanation and consideration of the surety's in-
terests may be placed on financial institutions.;] 
4.2.3 Changed circumstances 
It could well be that where the terms of the contract per se are not 
markedly in imbalance. but where the enforcement of otherwise acceptable 
terms are, in the circumstances as they have arisen later. against the good 
faith (as developed under the influence of the Constitution) that a court 
might refuse enforcement.32 This might be so where the risk of changed 
circumstances should. as a matter of reasonableness and social interest, 
be shifted to the other party. That could well be the case where the other 
party can reasonably be expected to carry the risk, for example where 
that party is economically better able to protect himself against the risk. 
An example would be the unreasonableness of calling up a mortgage loan 
in times of general economic depression. joblessness and high interest 
rates. where a particular borrower can no longer pay the instalments due 
to retrenchment and a steep rise in the interest rates. 
4.2.4 Rescission of a contract 
Although there is often in one case a variety of circumstances which might 
influence a court not to enforce the contract and which relate to and 
31 Cf the German case discussed by Strydom 1995: 696. For other such cases compare 
also Van der Merwe and Van Huyssteen 1995: 549; Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike 
Afrika Bpk v Saayman 1997 4 SA 302 (SeA). 
32 This principle is not new cf the discretion of the court in regard to specific 











































overlap with the different phases of contract at the same time. and 
although theoretically it probably is ultimately not desirable to make a 
clear distinction between the various phases and the applicable 
remedies. 33 it may be practical in this context to look at the conclusion 
phase separately. We know that subjective consensus is only one basis of 
contract. reasonable reliance being the other. We know that if there is a 
so-called "defect of will" the contract may be rescinded. We appreciate 
that "defect of will" refers to wrongful conduct which unacceptably limits 
unfettered freedom of decision and self-determination. This must be 
fertile soil for the values of the Constitution to take root and influence the 
development of the common law. The extension of the trite grounds for 
rescission (misrepresentation. duress and undue influence) seem indicated 
- at least to cater for abuse of circumstances other than personal 
ascendancy or power. What particularly comes to mind here is abuse of 
economic necessity. abuse of dire need for housing. abuse of personal 
inexperience and lack of judgement. and abuse of inequality of bargaining 
power. This extension just described should ideally be only a first step to 
the development and recognition of a general principle upon which 
rescission may be based. The principle itself is obvious - improper conduct. 
conduct against the good faith. even an extended notion of wrongful 
conduct in a contractual setting. Call it what you wish. What of course is not 
so obvious is the application and boundaries of the principle. However. that 
should not deter the courts - they make similar judgments every day. 
5 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion it is probably safe to say that the new era of constitu-
tionalism in South Africa will either directly or indirectly impact on free-
dom of contract - it will most often result in some limitation of the rather 
unfettered freedom which has enured to the benefit of the stronger party 
and will require that the reasonable interests of the community and of the 
other party be considered when concluding and enforcing a contract. 
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